Security model

Nobody but you can read your vault. Not even us.

Privora encrypts your connections, credentials and history on your own device, before anything is saved or synced. This page explains how, and where the guarantee stops.

The guarantee

No readable vault content on the server

Vault content can be decrypted only on your approved desktop, after you enter your Master Password.

Server databases, logs, backups and administrator tools never see vault content or a key that could decrypt it. Encryption at rest with a server-owned key would not meet this bar, so the service only ever receives data your device has already encrypted.

That covers hostnames, IP addresses, ports, usernames, labels, notes, passwords, private keys, passphrases, host fingerprints, groups, tags, preferences, connection history, drafts, pending changes and exports.

Keys

One Master Password per person

Your Master Password never leaves your device and is never used directly as an encryption key.

  1. Stretched with Argon2id

    Your password is run through Argon2id with a fresh random salt and a deliberately expensive memory profile, which makes offline guessing slow.

  2. Wraps a random root key

    The result unwraps a random user root key. Changing your Master Password re-wraps that key without re-encrypting the whole vault, and is crash-safe.

  3. Separate keys per purpose

    Local storage, vault records, team grants, enrollment and exports each use their own keys, bound to their context.

Cryptography

Standard building blocks, each with one job

No home-made ciphers. Every construction is pinned in a written design decision with test vectors.

Cryptographic algorithms and their purpose in Privora
PurposeAlgorithm
Master Password derivationArgon2id
Vault records, key wrapping, exportsAES-256-GCM with context-bound associated data
Local databaseSQLCipher with a random key from the native core. It fails closed rather than fall back to plain SQLite.
Device enrollment and team key grantsML-KEM-768 + X25519 hybrid (X-Wing) with HPKE and AES-256-GCM
Identity, device, membership and content signaturesML-DSA-65
Licenses and release manifestsML-DSA-65, from separate issuer and release trust roots
Transport to the sync serviceModern TLS. It is not the end-to-end boundary; the payload is already encrypted.
On your device

No plaintext left on disk

Privora is designed so the things it manages don't leak into ordinary files.

Encrypted staging

SFTP downloads live in encrypted staging, not a temp folder. Remote text is edited in memory.

Memory hygiene

Secrets are wiped when freed, and a crash-dump guard keeps vault contents out of crash reports.

No recordings

No terminal transcripts, keystroke logs, screenshots or session playback exist to leak.

Clipboard by intent

RDP text copy and paste happens only in the direction you enable, and Privora never saves or syncs clipboard content.

Separation of duties

The sync server can't push code or grant keys

Signed updates

Updates carry an ML-DSA-65 signed manifest, checked before the installer runs, on top of normal Windows code signing. The sync server holds no release-signing key.

Isolated license issuer

License keys live in a separate issuer. They can't encrypt or decrypt any vault.

Clients verify, servers route

Your desktop checks signed role and membership chains itself before accepting a change. Server permissions add a second check; they don't replace the first.

Owner-run infrastructure

The API, database, backups and releases run on infrastructure we control. No third-party cloud storage is involved.

Honest limits

What Privora can't protect against

Security claims are only useful when you know where they end.

A compromised computer

An unlocked app must hold some plaintext in memory to show it and to sign in to servers. Malware or a compromised operating system can capture it. Privora reduces exposure; it can't defeat an endpoint that's already compromised.

Live SSH and RDP transport

Post-quantum vault sync doesn't upgrade the remote server's SSH or RDP stack. Privora shows the properties each connection actually negotiated, and never labels ordinary RDP as post-quantum protected.

What teammates already saw

A member who could decrypt a shared password can keep a copy. Removing them stops future access and rotates the vault keys, but it can't recall data they already downloaded. Change the password on the server, too.

Your OS clipboard

Text you copy out of a remote desktop reaches your operating system's clipboard, where clipboard history or other apps may keep it.

A forgotten Master Password

We can't reset it for you. Account recovery restores access to your account, not to encrypted personal data.

Usage metadata

The service sees opaque IDs, ciphertext sizes, timing, billing status and connecting IP addresses. We keep that to what's needed and limit how long it's retained.

Status

Reviewed internally. Independent audit to come.

Privora has been through internal security reviews of its encryption, sync, administration and SSH/SFTP code, and the findings have been fixed. It has not yet had an independent external audit, and we won't describe it as audited until it has.

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